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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1230 
 ___________ 
 
 DAVID M. WILLIAMS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
CARL DANBERG, Commissioner of Corrections; TERRY ZINK, Esquire, Appeals 
Division; JTVCC RECORDS 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-00765) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 7, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 3, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Williams appeals the dismissal of his complaint and the denial of his 
motion for counsel.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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 Williams, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, filed the instant 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on September 4, 2010, alleging that the defendants were holding 
him in extended confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  He argued that the status sheet for his incarceration lists an incorrect case 
number, reflecting charges that were later consolidated or dismissed, and that this clerical 
error should result in the termination of the state sentence he is otherwise serving. 
 Williams had previously pursued a similar claim in Delaware state court, and the 
Delaware Supreme Court summarized his situation as follows: 
―[O]n April 1998, a grand jury returned three separate indictments against 
Williams. Williams failed to appear for his arraignment and was arrested in 
July 1998 on new criminal charges.  The grand jury returned a fourth 
indictment against Williams.  In October 1998, the State obtained a 
superseding indictment, which incorporated three of the indictments into 
the fourth.  Case ID 9803018202 was designated as the lead case. Four 
counts of the superseding indictment were later severed and redesignated as 
Case ID 9803018202B.  Williams ultimately was convicted of those four 
charges in August 1999. He was sentenced as a habitual offender.  . . . In 
July 2010, Williams filed a motion for correction of an illegal sentence 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) on the ground that his status 
sheet maintained by the Department of Correction incorrectly lists him as 
being convicted under the indictment in Case ID 9803018210, which was 
dismissed by the State upon the issuance of the superseding indictment.‖ 
Williams v. State, 7 A.3d 486, 2010 Del. LEXIS 571, at *1–2 (Del. 2010) (table).  The 
court denied Williams’s motion, holding that the sentence he was serving was statutorily 
authorized and legal, and was unaffected by the Department of Correction’s clerical error.  
Id. at *2.   
The District Court recognized that Williams’s complaint was a mere recasting of 
his earlier attempt to shorten his sentence; pursuant to its screening responsibilities under 
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), it dismissed the complaint and denied 
Williams’s request for counsel.  See Williams v. Danberg, No. 10-765, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 538, at *12–13 (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2011).     
 Our review of the District Court’s exercise of its screening authority is plenary, 
and we must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under Third Circuit LAR 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented by 
the appeal, and may do so on any ground supported by the record.  United States v. 
Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); Tourscher, 184 F.3d at 240. Denial of a 
motion for counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 It is clear that Williams’s suit is not viable in its present state.  Under the rule 
established by Heck v. Humphrey, a ―claim for damages bearing [a] relationship to a 
conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.‖  
512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); see also Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).  As 
the sentence has not been invalidated—indeed, as observed above, his sentence has 
recently been upheld—he cannot pursue monetary relief under § 1983.  To the extent that 
Williams seeks the equitable remedy of release from confinement,
1
 ―when a state 
                                                 
1
 In his complaint, Williams asked the District Court to ―issue injunctive relief, 
compensatory, for mistake of facts, negligence, also change in plea.‖  Compl. 4, ECF No. 
2.  However, he earlier specified that he ―request[ed] this Honorable Court to have [the 
prison] release Petitioner.‖  Compl. 3.   
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prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the 
relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier 
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.‖  
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (emphasis added).  Hence, Williams is 
required to pursue his claim under habeas corpus and not under § 1983.
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 We are also in full accord with the District Court that amendment of the complaint 
would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Williams would not be able to surmount the issues we identified above, let alone the 
various other deficiencies identified by the District Court.  It therefore follows that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel.  
 Having identified no substantial issue in this appeal, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court for the foregoing reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2
 Williams claims that he ―filed a section 2254 habeas corpus . . . [but] can’t get the 
proper document to send to [the] 3rd Circuit Court to file a successive habeas petition,‖ 
and he argues that he must be allowed to proceed under § 1983 when ―federal habeas is 
not available.‖  Pl.’s Mem. ¶ 5, ECF No. 7 (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998)).  
But Williams has, on multiple occasions, applied to this Court for leave to file a second 
or successive habeas petition.  See C.A. Nos. 10-3632, 08-2259.  Given these prior 
filings, we find it difficult to credit Williams’s protestations of inability.    
